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CHALLENGING LEGISLATIVE INFRINGEMENTS OF THE
INHERENT ABORIGINAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
Kent McNeil*
The Parliament of Canada exercised its s.91(24) legislative
authority over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians"
when it enacted the Indian Act in 1876. Through this Act and
its precursors, the Canadian government imposed the band gov-
ernance system on First Nations. Although traditional forms of
Aboriginal government were not abolished by the imposition of
this system, there can be no doubt that the capacity ofAboriginal
governments was impaired and the inherent right of self-govern-
ment of at least some First Nations was infringed. After the
enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, this
infringement of the inherent right of self-government would
have to be justified by the federal government in order to be
valid. Moreover, any post-section 35(1) amendments to the
band governance provisions would have to be justified to the
extent that they amounted toffurther infringements of the inher-
ent right. This would include, for example, the changes that
were proposed in the now defunct First Nations Governance
Act. Any First Nation that is subject to the Indian Act's band
governance provisions could challenge the application of those
provisions to it as an infringement of that First Nation ' inher-
ent right. The initial burden would be on the First Nation to
prove its right of self-government and to show a prima facie
infringement of that right by the Indian Act. Extinguishment
aside, the burden would then be on the Crown to prove justifica-
tion by establishing a valid legislative objective and respect for
the Crown 's fiduciary obligations. If the Crown failed to do so,
then the provisions of the Act that infringe that First Nation's
inherent right of self-government would be inapplicable to it.
Le Parlement du Canada a exerc! l'autorit! legislative sur
,,Les Indiens et les terres riservies pour les Indiens, que lui con-
Jere l'article 91(24) lorsqu'il a adopti la Loi sur les Indiens en
1876. Par le biais de cette loi et de sespricurseurs, le gouverne-
ment canadien a imposi aux Premieres Nations le syst~me de
gouvernance de bandes. Quoique les formes traditionnelles de
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gouvernement autochtone n 'aientpas tl abolies par limposition
de ce systkme, il n'y a aucun doute qu'il a affaibli la capaciti des
gouvernements autochtones et qu'il a porti atteinte au droit
inhirent h l'autonomie gouvernementale d'au moins quelques-
unes des Premikres Nations. Suite h l'adoption de l'article 35 de
la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, ilfaudrait que le gouverne-
mentfidlraljustifie cette atteinte au droit inhirent a l'auton-
omie gouvernementale pour qu'elle soit valable. De plus, il
faudrait que toute modification post-article 35(1) des disposi-
tions concernant la gouvernance de bandes soit justifile en
autant qu'elle constituerait une nouvelle atteinte au droit
inhirent. Cela inclurait, par example, les modifications pro-
posies dans la Loi sur la gouvernance des Premikres Nations
maintenant defunt. Toute Premiere Nation qui est assujettie aux
dispositions de gouvernance de bandes de la Loi sur les Indiens
pourrait contester l'application chez elle de ces dispositions
comme atteintes au droit inhrent de cette Premikre Nation. La
Premibre Nation aurait le fardeau initial d'dtablir son droit hl
l'autonomie gouvernementale et de dtmontrer que la Loi sur les
Indiens comporte une atteinte de prime abord h ce droit. Puis,
extinction h part, la Couronne aurait alors lefardeau d'itablir
la justification en indiquant un objectif ligislatif valable ainsi
que le respect de ses responsabilitis fiduciaires, faute de quoi les
dispositions de la Loi qui portent atteinte au droit inhirent
d'autonomie gouvernementale de cette Premikre Nation n'
seraitpas applicable.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 2002, the First Nations Governance Act (then Bill C-61) was
introduced in the House of Commons by then Minister of Indian Affairs, Rob-
ert Nault. After dying on the order paper when the first session of the 3 7 'h Par-
liament was prorogued, it was reintroduced as Bill C-7 in October, 2002. If
enacted, this legislation would, among other things, have replaced the band
governance provisions in the Indian Act.' Strong opposition to the proposed
legislation was voiced by many First Nation leaders, including Matthew Coon
Come, the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations at the time it was
introduced, and Roberta Jamieson, Chief of the Six Nations. 2 Among other
things, it was alleged that the new legislation would infringe the First Nations'
inherent right of self-government that is thought to be constitutionally pro-
tected as an Aboriginal and/or treaty right by section 35(1) of the Constitution
I R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5.
2 E.g., see B. Laghi "Natives Vow to Battle Bill" Globe and Mail (15 June 2002) A7; A. J. Hall
"Making Sense of the New Indian Act" Winnipeg Free Press (15 August 2002) A13.
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Act, 1982.3 This allegation raises a fundamental issue: if First Nations have a
constitutionally protected right of self-government, does federal legislation that
imposes a certain form of government on First Nations infringe that right?
More specifically, if the First Nations Governance Act would have infringed that
right, what about the band governance provisions that are in the current Indian
Act? Are they any less subject to constitutional challenge? This article will seek
to answer these questions by examining the historical development of the
Indian Act's band governance provisions and assessing the impact of section
35(1) on their constitutional validity. It will then offer some general thoughts
on how legislative changes like those that were proposed in the First Nations
Governance Act might be challenged.
The inherent right of self-government can be defined as the right of the
Aboriginal peoples to govern their own territories and peoples within Canada.
4
It is inherent in the sense that it is derived not from the Canadian Constitution
or Canadian law, but from the existence of Aboriginal nations as independent
cultural, social, and political entities with their own laws and systems of govern-
ment prior to European colonization of North America.
The inherent right of self-government has been recognized politically in Can-
ada. In the negotiations leading to the Charlottetown Accord that was submitted
to the Canadian electorate in 1992, the Prime Minister, provincial premiers, ter-
ritorial leaders, and Aboriginal representatives all agreed that such a right exists
and should be explicitly acknowledged in the Constitution. While the Accord
was rejected by the electorate (for reasons that probably had very little to do with
Aboriginal self-government), acceptance of the inherence of the right by Can-
ada's political leaders was a significant endorsement of the position that Aborig-
inal peoples have generally taken all along.5 Despite the rejection of the
Charlottetown Accord, the Canadian government reaffirmed its acceptance of
the inherent right in 1995 in a policy guide entitled Aboriginal Self-Government.
6
The question of whether the inherent right of self-government is an Aborigi-
3 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. Section 35(1) provides: "The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed."
4 The "within Canada" limitation arises from my conviction that, assuming the right of self-gov-
ernment is a s.35(1) right, it is very unlikely the Supreme Court of Canada will ever accept that
it includes a right to secede from Canada and form independent nation-states. In Reference Re
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the Court held that the population of Quebec does not
have a right of self-determination that would entitle Quebec to secede from Canada unilaterally.
I think it improbable that the Court would come to a different conclusion where the Aboriginal
peoples are concerned. In Mitchell v. MN.R., 2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, for example, Binnie J. (Major
J. concurring) expressed the opinion that the rights that are recognized and affirmed by s.35(l)
have to be compatible with Canadian sovereignty.
5 See "The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments"
in K. McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) [EmergingJustice.] at 161.
6 Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aboriginal Self-Government (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995). See also Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, Gathering Strength: Canada s Aboriginal Action Plan (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) [Gathering Strength] at 13.
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nal right that has been recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 has not yet been addressed directly by the Supreme Court of
Canada. In R. v. Pamajewon,7 the Court assumed, without deciding, that an
Aboriginal right ofself-government is included in section 35 (1)8 In Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia,9 the Court declined to decide or even provide guidance on
the issue of self-government. 10 However, in that case ChiefJustice Lamer defined
Aboriginal title in a way that appears to make self-government a necessary ele-
ment of it:
A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held com-
munally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal
persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an
aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made
by that community." I
The significance of this passage was perceived by Justice Williamson in Camp-
bell v. British Columbia (Attorney General),12 a case involving a challenge to the
constitutionality of the governance provisions in the Nisga'a Treaty that was
finalized on August 4, 1998. In upholding the validity of these provisions, Wil-
liamson J. found that the
... passages from Delgamuukw suggesting the right for the commu-
nity to decide to what uses the land encompassed by their Aborigi-
nal title can be put are determinative of the question. The right to
Aboriginal title "in its full form", including the right for the com-
munity to make decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the
right to have a political structure for making those decisions, is, I
conclude, constitutionally guaranteed by Section 35.13
The same reasoning would seem to extend the scope of the right of self-govern-
ment to Aboriginal and treaty rights generally, which the Supreme Court in
other cases has held are likewise communal and subject to the decision-making
authority of the Aboriginal community that holds them.14
While Campbell was only a decision of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, it was not appealed and so remains the law of British Columbia so long
as it is not overruled by a higher court. I doubt it will be, for several reasons.
7 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821.
8 Ibid. at para. 24.
9 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw].
10 Ibid. at para. 170, Lamer C.J. said: "The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant
need for a new trial, make it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self-
government has been made out. Moreover, this is not the right case for the Court to lay down
the legal principles to guide future litigation."
11 Ibid. at para. 115 [emphasis in original].
12 12000] 4 C.N.L.R. I (B.C.S.C.) [Campbell].
13 Ibid at para. 137.
14 See R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at paras. 35-36; R. v. Marshall [No. 2], [1999] 3
S.C.R. 533, at paras. 17, 38.
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First, as the Supreme Court of Canada has been encouraging parties to resolve
issues of Aboriginal rights through negotiation rather than litigation,"' the
Court is unlikely to undermine the negotiation process by ruling that negoti-
ated self-government agreements are unconstitutional. To the extent that the
constitutionality of these agreements is dependent on the inherent right of self-
government, at least, the Court is likely to uphold the right. Secondly, the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was convinced that this right is already con-
stitutionally entrenched in section 35(1),16 and this position has been accepted
by the Canadian government and is supported by most academic commen-
tary.' 7 Thirdly, in his concurring judgment in the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Mitchellv. M.N.R.,' 18 Justice Binnie went to lengths to explain that, even
though an Aboriginal right to bring goods into Canada duty free would be
inconsistent with Canadian sovereignty, this does not mean that Aboriginal
peoples do not have an internal right of self-government. \While Chief Justice
McLachlin did not address this issue in her judgment, which was concurred in
by four of her colleagues, I think Binnie J.'s opinion provides an indication of
the direction the Court may take in the event that a properly-framed self-gov-
ernment case comes before it.
For the purposes of this article, I am therefore going to assume that the inher-
ent right of self-government is an Aboriginal right that has already been recog-
nized and affirmed by section 35(1). I will now turn to the question of whether
the provisions respecting band governance in the Indian Act infringe this right.
II. INFRINGEMENT OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT BY THE INDIANACT
A. Band Governance under the Indian Act and Its Predecessors
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,19 gave the Parliament of Can-
15 E.g., see Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 186 (Lamer C.J.).
16 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confideration: Aboriginal Peoples, Self
Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993)
(hereinafter Partners in Confederation]; Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996) [RCAP Report], Vol. 2, Restructuring the Rela-
tionship, Pt. 1, 202-13.
17 Gathering Strength, supra note 6 at 13. For commentary, see M. Asch, Home and Native Land:
Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), and "Aboriginal
Self-Government and the Construction of Canadian Constitutional Identity" (1992) 30 Alta.
L. Rev. 465; B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 681, and "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196; J.
Borrows, "Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal
Proclamation" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1, and "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delga-
muukw v. British Columbia" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537; P. Monture-Angus, Journeying
Forward: Dreaming First Nations'Independence (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999); D. Rus-
sell, A People's Dream: Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); P.
Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2001). I have reached the same conclusion in my own work: see especially "Aboriginal
Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" and "Envisaging Constitu-
tional Space for Aboriginal Governments", in Emerging Justice, supra note 5 at 58 and 184.
18 Supra note 4.
19 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c.3.
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ada exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians."
Pursuant to this authority, Parliament enacted a precursor to the Indian Act in
1869, entitled An Act for the gradual enfianchisement of Indians, the better man-
agement of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria,
Chapter 42.20 This was the first Canadian statute to make provision for Indian
band governance by elected chiefs.2' Section 10 provided:
10. The Governor may order that the Chiefs of any tribe, band or
body of Indians shall be elected by the male members of each
Indian Settlement of the full age of twenty-one years at such
time and place, and in such manner, as the Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs may direct, and they shall in such case
be elected for a period of three years, unless deposed by the
Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, or immorality, and
they shall be in the proportion of one Chief and two Second
Chiefs for every two hundred people; but any such band com-
posed of thirty people may have one Chief; Provided always
that all life Chiefs now living shall continue as such until death
or resignation, or until their removal by the Governor for dis-
honesty, intemperance or immorality.
Section 11 of the Act imposed a duty on chiefs to maintain or pay for the main-
tenance of the roads, bridges, ditches, and fences on their reserves. Section 12
listed the legislative powers of chiefs:
12. The Chief or Chiefs of any Tribe in Council may frame, sub-
ject to confirmation by the Governor in Council, rules and reg-
ulations for the following subjects:
1. The care of the public health.
2. The observance of order and decorum at assemblies of the
people in General Council, or on other occasions.
3. The repression of intemperance or profligacy.
4. The prevention of trespass by cattle.
5. The maintenance of roads, bridges, ditches and fences.
6. The construction of and maintaining in repair of school
houses, council houses and other Indian public buildings.
7. The establishment of pounds and the appointment of
pound-keepers.
These provisions were continued in 1876 in the first consolidated Indian
Act, 2 2 with some additions and minor variations. The duty to maintain roads
was made enforceable by obligatory labour imposed by the Superintendent-
20 S.C. 1869 (32 & 33 Vict.), c.6.
21 See R. H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 2nd ed. (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1988) at 17-18.
22 S.C. 1876 (39 Vict.), c.18.
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General of Indian Affairs on Indians residing on reserves who were engaged in
agriculture, on penalty of imprisonment in the event of non-performance.
23
The provision for the election of chiefs remained substantially the same, with
the significant addition of "incompetency" to the list of causes for which chiefs
could be removed by the Governor. 24 To the seven legislative powers of chiefs
was added an eighth, the authority to make rules and regulations for "[t]he
locating of the land in their reserves, and the establishment of a register of such
locations". 25 This power related to the authority given to bands to allocate lots,
with the approval of the Superintendent-General, to band members. 26 Admin-
istrative decisions of this sort could be made on behalf of the band by a majority
of the chiefs, "at a council summoned according to their rules, and held in the
presence of the Superintendent-General or his agent." 27 While this provision
reveals that chiefs also had the authority to make rules regarding their meetings,
control of those meetings by the Superintendent-General was nonetheless
maintained by the obligatory presence of the Indian agent. However, authority
to surrender reserve lands to the Crown was not delegated to the chiefs, as a
majority of the adult male members resident on or near the reserve had to assent
to any such surrender "at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that pur-
pose according to their rules, and held in the presence.of the Superintendent-
General, or of an officer duly authorized to attend such council by the Gover-
nor in Council or by the Superintendent-General". 28 So in the case of surren-
ders of reserve lands, the rules for the meetings were those of the adult male
members who must, therefore, have had the authority to make such rules.
29
In 1880, the Indian Act was amended. 3' For the most part, the band gover-
23 Ibid., s.23.
24 Ibid., s.62.
25 Ibid., s.63.
26 Ibid., s.6. Upon approval, the Superintendent-General was required by s.7 to issue location tick-
ets, which are now known as certificates of possession.
27 Ibid., s.61.
28 Ibid., s.26. This provision can be compared with the surrender provisions in the Royal Proclama-
tion of1763, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. I, No. 1, at 6, providing for the purchase of Indian
lands by the Crown "at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that
Purpose".
29 Section 26 replaced s.8 of An Act providingfor the organisation of the Department of the Secretary
of State of Canada, and flr the Management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, S.C. 1868 (31 Vict.),
c.42, which had provided for surrender of reserve lands by assent of the chief or a majority of
the chiefs "at a meeting or council of the tribe, band or body [of Indians] summoned for that
purpose according to their rules and entitled under this Act to vote thereat, and held in the pres-
ence of the Secretary of State or of an officer duly authorized to attend such council by the Gov-
ernor in Council or by the Secretary of State; provided that no Chief or Indian shall be entitled
to vote or be present at such council, unless he habitually resides on or near the lands in ques-
tion". It is notable that the implicit acknowledgment in 1868 of the authority of the tribes or
bands to choose their own leaders in their own ways had disappeared by 1876, having been
replaced by the provisions for election of chiefs and for surrenders of reserve lands by a majority
vote of adult males. Nonetheless, of necessity those bands that had not been brought under the
Act's electoral provisions must have continued to choose their leaders in accordance with their
own customs, a fact that was explicitly acknowledged in 1951 when the Indian Act was revised:
see text following note 43, infra.
30 By The Indian Act, 1880, S.C. 1880 (43 Vict.), c.28.
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nance provisions remained the same, though the discretionary nature of the
Canadian government's power to impose the elective system on any band was
fortified with the words that this could be done "[w]henever the Governor in
Council deems it advisable for the good government of a band" and the tenure
of life chiefs was made subject to the introduction of the elective system.3 The
legislative powers of chiefs were expanded to include designation of the religious
denomination required of teachers on reserves, protection of sheep, horses,
mules, and cattle, construction and maintenance of water-courses, and repres-
sion of noxious weeds.32 More significantly, chiefs were given the authority to
create penalties of fines (up to $30), imprisonment (up to 30 days), or both for
infraction of band rules and regulations. Imposition of these penalties, however,
was by proceedings "in the usual summary way before a Justice of the Peace, fol-
lowing the procedure on summary trials before a justice out of sessions." 33 So,
while the Indian Act conferred legislative and executive functions on chiefs, the
jurisdiction to enforce band rules and regulations was expressly given to Cana-
dian courts.
More significant changes to band governance were made in the Indian
Advancement Act, 1884,34 which was to be applied to any bands that the Gover-
nor in Council "considered fit to have this Act applied to them."35 The Act pro-
vided for band governance by band councils to be elected yearly by the adult
male members resident on the reserve. 36 The elected councillors were autho-
rized to choose a "chief councillor" from among their number at their first
meeting. 37 Band councils were empowered to make by-laws, rules, and regula-
tions, subject to approval and confirmation by the Superintendent-General, in
relation to the same subjects that the chiefs had legislative authority over by vir-
tue of the Indian Act, 1880. In addition, they could appoint constables and
erect "lock-ups" to enforce the observance of order, but, as provided in the 1880
Act, enforcement of band by-laws by fine or imprisonment was through pro-
ceedings before a Justice of the Peace. 38 Other powers included the making of
by-laws for the removal and punishment of trespassers on the reserve and for the
raising of money "by assessment and taxation on the lands of Indians enfran-
chised, or in possession of lands by location ticket in the reserve".3 9 Band coun-
cils were also empowered to make provision for "appropriation and payment to
the local Agent as Treasurer by the Superintendent General of so much of the
moneys of the band as may be required for defraying expenses necessary for car-
rying out the by-laws made by the council".40 So the Indian agent not only pre-
31 Ibid., s.72.
32 Ibid., s.74.
33 Ibid.
34 S.C. 1884 (47 Vict.), c.28.
35 Ibid., s.3.
36 Ibid., ss. 5, 7.
37 Ibid., s.6.
38 Ibid., s.10 (3) and (13).
39 Ibid., s.10 (10) and (11).
40 Ibid., s.10 (12).
Vol. 22 Challenging Legislative Infringements
sided at and controlled council meetings, 4' but also acted as treasurer for the
band council.
The dual system of band governance by elected chiefs under the Indian Act,
1880 and by elected band councils under the Indian Advancement Act, 1884
was continued, with minor amendments, until 1951, when the Indian Act was
revised.42 Several significant changes in relation to band governance were made
at that time. The dual electoral system in place since 1884 was replaced by one
system of band government by a single chief and one councillor for every 100
band members (from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 12 councillors) to be
elected by the adult members (including, for the first time since 1869, women)
who were "ordinarily resident" on the reserve. 43 Nevertheless, a new definition
of "council of the band" was added that explicitly envisaged the selection of
band councils by the "custom of the band":
2. (1)(a) "council of the band" means
(i) in the case of a band to which section seventy-three
[the election provision, now s.74] applies, the coun-
cil established pursuant to that section,
(ii) in the case of a band to which section seventy-three
does not apply, the council chosen according to the
custom of the band, or, where there is no council,
the chief chosen according to the custom of the
band.
By expressly bringing band councils chosen by custom within the definition of
"council of the band," the 1951 Act effectively brought bands that are not sub-
ject to its electoral provisions within the scope of the Act's other band council
provisions. But was this already the case under the earlier Indian Acts that con-
tained no definition of "council of the band" and no reference to selection of
leaders in accordance with band custom?
41 Ibid., s.9. The agent's role in this regard was set out in detail, unlike the simple requirement in
the earlier Indian Acts that the Superintendent General or his agent be present at council meet-
ings (see text accompanying note 27, supra). Section 9 of the 1884 Act specified that the agent
was to call the meetings, preside over them, record the proceedings, and "have full power to
control and regulate all matters of procedure and form, and to adjourn the meeting to a time
named or sine die, and to report and certify all by-laws and other acts and proceedings of the
council to the Superintendent General". Moreover, the section provided that "he shall address
the council and explain and advise them upon their powers and duties, and any matter requir-
ing their consideration, but shall have no vote on any question to be decided by the council".
Equivalent provisions respecting the role of Indian agents at council meetings of chiefs under
the old system were incorporated into the Indian Act by An Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C.
1936, c.20, s.5.
42 S.C. 1951, c.29. In 1906, the Indian Act and the Indian Advancement Act were amalgamated as
the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, Parts I and 11 respectively. The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.98,
continued this amalgamation.
43 S.C. 1951, c.29, ss. 73-78. Note that the residency requirement was rendered unconstitutional
by s.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Pt. I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
supra note 3: see Corhiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
203 [Corbiere], discussed infra in text accompanying notes 124-40.
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I think the answer to this question is probably yes. The 1876 Indian Act pro-
vided that it applied "to all the Provinces, and to the North West Territories,
including the Territory of Keewatin." 44 It also provided in section 97:
97. The Governor in Council may, by proclamation from time to
time, exempt from the operation of this Act, or from the opera-
tion of any one or more of the sections of this Act, Indians or
non-treaty Indians, or any of them, or any band or irregular
band of them, or the reserves or special reserves, or Indian
lands or any portions of them, in any province, in the North-
West Territories, or in the territory of Keewatin, or in either of
them, and may again, by proclamation from time to time,
remove such exemption.
45
It is therefore apparent that the Act was intended to apply to Indian bands gen-
erally, except to the extent that the Governor in Council had either exempted its
application to them pursuant to section 97 or had not exercised the authority
required to make a specific provision of the Act (e.g., the provision for election
of chiefs) apply to a particular band.
The by-law making authority of band councils was expanded somewhat in
the 1951 Act to include such on-reserve matters as the regulation of traffic, pre-
vention of disorderly conduct and nuisances, conservation and management of
fish and game, and zoning of lands. 46 By-laws made pursuant to this authority
were (and continue to be) subject to disallowance by the Minister.47 However,
the provisions respecting Indian agents' presence at and control over band
council meetings were removed. The new Act nonetheless retained the distinc-
tion between ordinary and more "advanced" bands that had first appeared in
the Indian Advancement Act, 1884. Section 82 provided that "where the Gover-
nor in Council declares that a band has reached an advanced stage of develop-
ment,"48 the band council could, with the approval of the Minister, make by-
laws in relation to the taxation of reserve lands, licensing of businesses, expendi-
ture of band moneys, hiring of staff, payment of salaries, and so on. However, as
in earlier versions of the Indian Act,49 authority to surrender reserve lands was
44 S.C. 1876 (39 Vict.), c.18, s.1. This was before the Yukon Territory was carved out of the
North-West Territories in 1898.
45 Versions of this provision have been retained up to the present. The current Indian Act, R.S.C.
1985, c.I-5, provides in s. 4 (2):
4.(2) The Governor in Council may by proclamation declare that this Act
or any portion thereof, except sections 5 to 14.3 [regarding definition
and registration of Indians] or sections 37 to 41 (regarding surrender
of reserve lands], shall not apply to
(a) any Indians or any group or band of Indians, or
(b) any reserve or any surrendered lands or any part thereof, and may
by proclamation revoke any such declaration.
46 S.C. 1951, c.29, s.80.
47 Ibid., s. 81(2), currently R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, s.82(2).
48 S.C. 1951, c.29, s.84, empowered the Governor in Council to revoke such a declaration.
49 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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not given to the band council, but was now vested in the adult band members
generally rather than just the adult males.50
After 1951, no significant amendments were made to the band governance
provisions of the Indian Act until 1985. As those amendments came after the rec-
ognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, examination of them will be postponed until we consider
the impact of section 35(1). But first we must determine whether the provisions
relating to band governance in the pre-1982 Indian Acts and their predecessors
amounted to infringements of the inherent right of self-government.
B. Pre-Section 35(1) Infringement of the Inherent Right of Self-
Government
Two initial points must be made. First, in Canadian constitutional law the
Parliament of Canada has had general authority to infringe Aboriginal and
treaty rights ever since Confederation. 5 1 Prior to the enactment of section 35(1)
in 1982, these infringements did not have to be justified. 52 After Aboriginal and
treaty rights received constitutional protection in 1982, infringements of these
rights by Parliament have required justification. 53 We will come back to this
matter of justification later.
The second point is that the enactment of the band governance provisions in
the Indian Act and its predecessors would not necessarily have infringed the
inherent right of self-government of any particular First Nation. As we have
seen, for the election provisions that were first enacted in 1869 to apply to any
particular band, the Canadian government must declare them to apply to that
band. 54 Other provisions, however, such as the statutory powers of chiefs and
band councils, appear to apply of their own force to all bands not subject to an
exemption. 55 So even if a band continued to select its leaders according to its
own laws and customs, in the absence of an exemption those leaders would
apparently be subject to the other governance provisions of the Indian Act.56
50 S.C. 1951, c.29, s.39. Note, however, that the provision that the surrender meeting be sum-
moned "according to their rules" (Indian Act, S.C. 1876, c.18, s.26(1)) or "according to the
rules of the band" (Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c.43, s.39(a), and subsequent Acts) was removed.
51 There may, however, be some restrictions on this authority in constitutional instruments appli-
cable in specific regions, such as the Rupert's Land and North- Western Territory Order of June 23,
1870, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 9: see K. McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert's Land
and the North-Western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).
52 See R. v. Sikyea, (1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267; Daniels v. White, [1968]
S.C.R. 517; R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.LR. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.).
53 E.g., see R v. Sparrow, f1990 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Gladstone, [19961 2 S.C.R. 723; Delga-
muukw, supra note 9; R v. Marshall[No. 2], supra note 14.
54 See supra notes 21, 31, and accompanying text. This is still the case today: see the Indian Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5, s.74(1). See also text accompanying note 140, infra.
55 On the Governor in Council's authority to exempt bands from provisions of the Indian Act, see
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56 See Bigstone v. Big Eagle, [1993] 1 C.N.L.R. 25 (F.C.T.D.) at 33; Canatonquin v. Gabriel,
[1981] 4 C.N.L.R. 61 (EC.A.), affirming [1978 1 EC. 124 (EC.T.D.); Jenniss c. Jenniss,
[2000] 1 C.N.L.R. 134 (Que. S.C.).
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For discussion purposes, let us start by looking at First Nations that were
subjected to the election provisions of the Indian Act. In 1924, the Governor in
Council imposed these provisions on the Six Nations in southern Ontario by an
order in council made under the authority of the Act.5 7 This order was replaced
by an equivalent order in council in 1951 made under the new Act.58 In Davey
v. Isaac,59 members of the Six Nations representing the "Hereditary Chiefs"
challenged the validity of this imposition of the electoral system on the basis
that the Indian Act did not apply to the Six Nations, as they did not constitute a
"band" within the meaning of that term as defined in the Act. The Supreme
Court held the Six Nations to be a "band" at the relevant time because they fit
at least one of the definitions of that term in the 1951 Act, namely "a body of
Indians ... for whose use and benefit in common, moneys are held by His Maj-
esty".60 The Court therefore found the 1951 order in council to be valid. Exer-
cise of the statutory authority accorded to the elected band council by the
Indian Act was therefore legal.
Imposition of the electoral system is clearly regarded by many members of
the Six Nations as an infringement of their inherent right of self-government,
exercised traditionally by the Hereditary Chiefs. At trial in Davey v. Isaac, Jus-
tice Oster of the Ontario High Court observed:
A large proportion of the inhabitants of the Six Nations lands have
resisted [the electoral] system from its beginning and take the posi-
tion that the only persons entitled to govern the Six Nations people
have been and continue to be those who become members of the
council of traditional chiefs....
61
The legal action was initiated because the defendants, who supported the
Hereditary Chiefs, had padlocked the doors of the council house where the
elected band council met, in an apparent effort to prevent the council from
dealing with lands on the Six Nations Reserve. 62 The elected band councillors
asked for and got a permanent injunction that restrained the defendants from
obstructing the plaintiffs in their lawful use of the council house.
63
57 At the time, the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, s.93. For background and discussion, see D.
Johnston, "The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44 U. T.
Fac. L. Rev. 1.
58 Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c.29, s.73.
59 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 897. While the term "Hereditary Chiefs" is used in this court case, it probably
is not an accurate description of the traditional leadership of the Six Nations: see T. Porter, "Tra-
ditions of the Constitution of the Six Nations", in L. Little Bear, M. Boldt and J. A. Long, eds.,
Pathways to Self-Determination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) at 14.
60 The full definition in the Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c.29, s.2(1)(a), provided that "'band' means a
body of Indians (i) for whose use and benefit in common, lands, the legal title to which is vested
in His Majesty, have been set apart before or after the coming into force of this Act, (ii) for
whose use and benefit in common, moneys are held by His Majesty, or (iii) declared by the
Governor in Council to be a band for the purposes of this Act".
61 Isaacv. Davey (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 23 (Ont. H.C.), at 26, rev'd (1974), 5 OR. (2d) 610,
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 897.
62 See ibid., 38 D.L.R. (3d) at 25.
63 Davey v. Isaac, supra note 59, upholding the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal: Isaac v.
Davey (1974), 5 OR. (2d) 610, which had reversed the decision of the trial judge.
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It might be argued that imposition of the electoral system on the Six Nations
did not infringe their inherent right of self-government because it did not make
the traditional government of the Hereditary Chiefs illegal or prevent it from
functioning. While this may be arguable as a strict matter of law, it is unrealis-
tic. As a practical matter, the authority conferred on the elected council by the
Indian Act has had a direct impact on the ability of the Hereditary Chiefs to
exercise their traditional functions. The conflict between the two forms of gov-
ernment is apparent from the facts in Davey v. Isaac, referred to above. It is also
revealed by the earlier case of Logan v. Styres," which involved an application by
a member of the Six Nations for a declaration that the orders in council impos-
ing the electoral system on the Six Nations in 1924 and 1951 were ultra vires
and for an injunction to restrain the elected band council from "taking any
steps to facilitate the surrender of 3.05 acres" of the Six Nations Reserve.
65
While authority to assent to surrenders of reserve lands had been vested in the
adult band members by the 1951 Indian Act,66 King J. pointed out that "[i]t is
the elected Councillors who negotiate the terms of surrender."67 He said as well
that "[i]t would appear that many of the Six Nations Indians, a great majority in
fact, do not recognize the authority of the Parliament of Canada to provide for
elected Councillors or to provide for the surrender of Reserve lands by means of
a vote." 68 He also acknowledged that the "Orders in Council to which objec-
tion is taken set up a system whereby elected Councillors would supplant the
hereditary Chiefs among other matters in dealing with the surrender of Reserve
lands." 69 To the extent that statutory powers were conferred on the elected band
council by the Indian Act, King J. thought that the elected council had replaced
the traditional government of the Hereditary Chiefs. So in the case of the Six
Nations, imposition of the electoral system evidently did infringe their inherent
right of self-government.
70
Let us now consider the hypothetical case of a First Nation that did not have
the electoral system imposed upon it, but that continued to choose its leaders in
accordance with its own customs, as envisaged by the 1951 Indian Act.7 1 In this
situation, we concluded above that, in the absence of an exemption, the other
band governance provisions of the Indian Act probably would have applied to
the chief and/or council chosen by custom. 72 Those leaders would therefore
64 (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 416 (Ont. H.C.).
65 Ibid. at 4 17.
66 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
67 Supra note 64 at 418.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. at 4 17-18.
70 A prima facie infringement apparently occurs if there is "any meaningfU diminution of the
appellants' rights": R. v. Gladstone, supra note 53 at para. 43 (Lamer C.J.). Factors to be consid-
ered in this context are whether the limitation is "unreasonable", whether it imposes "undue
hardship," and whether it denies "to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising
that right": R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1112 (Dickson C.J. and La Forest J.). In R. v. Cit,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at para. 75, Lamer C.J. stated that "[t]he guiding inquiry at the infringe-
ment stage remains whether the regulations at issue represent a primafacie interference with the
appellant's aboriginal or treaty rights." See also R. v. Nikal, [19961 1 S.C.R. 1013, at paras. 86-
108 (CoryJ.); R. v. Badger, [19961 1 S.C.R. 771, at paras. 86-95 (CoryJ.).
71 See text following note 43, supra.
72 See supra notes 45, 54-56, and accompanying text.
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have the authority to exercise the statutory powers conferred on band councils
by the Act. So wouldthe conferral of those statutory powers have amounted to
an infringement of that First Nation's inherent right of self-government? The
answer to this question is not as clear as in a case like that of the Six Nations,
where the electoral system was imposed against the wishes of a majority of the
people. The answer really depends on whether the statutory powers merely com-
plemented, or curtailed and replaced, the authority of the leaders under the First
Nation's traditional form of government. If the former, then arguably there
would be no infringement of the inherent right. If the latter, then application of
the Indian Act to that First Nation would no doubt have amounted to an
infringement.
The question of whether the band governance provisions of the Indian Act
constitute an infringement of the inherent right of self-government of First
Nations who choose their leaders by custom has not yet been determined by a
Canadian court. It has been generally assumed that the authority of band coun-
cils is derived solely from the Indian Act,73 but that assumption appears to have
been made without considering the circumstances of First Nations that choose
their leaders by custom. Given that the Indian Act does not purport to codify
the authority of leaders chosen by custom or to take away any powers they
might have as traditional leaders exercising inherent rights of self-government,
arguably the statutory powers of those leaders function in addition to, rather
than in derogation of, their inherent powers. 74 If so, it would seem to follow that
the governance provisions of the Indian Act have not infringed the inherent
right of those First Nations.
It is probably unwise to attempt to arrive at any general conclusions regard-
ing this question because the circumstances of First Nations vary. Some First
Nations who currendy choose their leaders by custom have reverted to that
method after operating for years under the electoral system. 7 5 Others may never
have had the electoral system imposed on them. Also, the extent to which the
band governance provisions of the Indian Act have impacted on the inherent
right of self-government of any particular First Nation depends very much on
the nature of that Nation's traditional form of government. It would therefore
be necessary to examine the circumstances of each First Nation to determine
whether the Indian Act's band governance provisions have amounted to an
73 E.g., see Paul Bandv. R., [1984] 1 C.N.L.R. 87 (Alta. CA.), at 92-94; St. Mary's Indian Bandy.
Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1996] 2 C.N.L.RI 214
(F.C.T.D.)., affirmed [1997] 1 C.N.L.R. 206 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused 20
February 1997. Compare Telecom Leasing Canada (TLC) Ltd. v. Enoch Indian Band of Stony
Plains Indian Reserve No. 135, [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 206 (Alta. Q.B.).
74 For discussion and further supporting arguments, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Governments
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5, 215 at
232-38.
75 E.g., the Akwesasne, Blood, Cowessess and Sioux Valley First Nations: see Jock v. Canada (Min-
iiter of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 103 (EC.T.D.); Crow v. Blood Indian
Band Council, [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 76 (F.C.T.D.); Sparvier v. Cowessess Indian Band #73, [1994]
1 C.N.LR. 182 (EC.T.D.) [Sparvier]; Bonev. Sioux Valley Indian BandNo. 290 Council, [1996]
3 C.N.L.R. 54 (F.C.T.D.) [Bone].
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infringement of its inherent right.76 It can, however, be safely concluded that
those provisions have infringed the inherent rights of at least some First
Nations, as the example of the Six Nations demonstrates.
77
C. Post-Section 35(1) Infringement of the Inherent Right of Self-
Government
We have seen that, prior to the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, infringements of the inherent right of self-government by the
Parliament of Canada did not have to be justified.7 8 That changed when section
35(1) came into force on April 17, 1982. Moreover, it seems that the infringe-
ments that have had to be justified since that time are not just those imposed
after section 35(1) came into force. Any infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty
right that originated before that time has to be justified as well if the right was
76 This approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court decisions cited supra in note 70, which
have dealt with the infringement issue in the context of the circumstances of the First Nation
concerned and the particular statute or regulations that allegedly infringed its Aboriginal or
treaty rights. See also Delgamuuku4 supra note 9 at para. 165, where Lamer C.J. said that
whether an infringement is justifiable "is ultimately a question of fact that will have to be exam-
ined on a case-by-case basis."
77 A further complicating factor is the identification of the Aboriginal group in which the right of
self-government is vested. In some instances, a contemporary First Nation corresponds to an
Aboriginal nation or other group that governed itself at the time of European colonization. In
other instances, however, Aboriginal nations have been fragmented into separate First Nations
or Indian bands as a result of colonization, the creation of reserves, and the imposition of the
Indian Act's band governance system. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples took the
position that the inherent right of self-government is vested in Aboriginal nations, numbering
between 60 and 80, rather than in local communities: see RCAP Report, supra note 16, Vol. 2,
Restructuring the Relationship, Pt. 1, 177-84, 234-36. See also Gathering Strength, supra note 6
at 13, where the federal government supported this position. In R. v. Pamajewon, supra note 7,
however, the Supreme Court seems to have assumed that contemporary Ojibwa First Nations
can have rights of self-government derived from the pre-colonization Ojibwa people. Moreover,
the Federal Court, in relation to the selection of band councils by the "custom of the band," has
accepted that Indian Act bands have "always had" an "inherent power" to select their leaders by
customs that have "developed over decades if not centuries": Bone, supra note 75 at 65 (see also
the other cases cited in the same note). I am nonetheless conscious of the paradox arising from
this conclusion that statutorily-defined Aboriginal groups (Indian bands) can hold inherent
rights. The difficulty arises from the colonial reality that Aboriginal nations have had definitions
of who they are imposed on them by the Indian Act for over 100 years. As a consequence, many
Aboriginal nations today find themselves in a situation where some aspects of their inherent
right of self-government may in fact be exercised by Indian Act bands. This would appear to be
the case where selection of band councils by custom is concerned. While band councils them-
selves may not be an expression of the inherent right of self-government of many Aboriginal
nations, colonialism has resulted in a situation whereby the selection of band councils by cus-
tom has become an expression of the right of self-government in that context. Aboriginal
nations should not be prejudiced by this paradox, especially because it was not of their making
and was possibly in violation of Canada's fiduciary obligations. For further discussion, see K.
McNeil, "Section 91(24) Powers, the Inherent Right of Self-Government, and Canada's Fidu-
ciary Obligations", a research report prepared for the Office of the B.C. Regional Vice-Chief of
the Assembly of First Nations, August, 2002, reproduced in Canadian Aboriginal Law 2002,
Conference Materials, Ottawa, 5-6 December 2002 (Vancouver: Pacific Busines & Law Insti-
tute, 2002), especially at 11-12, 15-19, 23-24.
78 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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unextinguished and so still existed on April 17, 1982, and the infringement of it
continued thereafter.
79
This means that any pre-section 35(1) infringements of the inherent right of
self-government of particular First Nations by the Indian Act's band governance
provisions that continued after April 17, 1982 would have to be justified. 80 For
example, imposition of the electoral system on the Six Nations, if it continued
after the enactment of section 35(1), would be an infringement of their unex-
tinguished inherent right of self-government that would have to be justified. 8'
The justification test, as formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Spar-
row,82 involves proof by the Crown of a valid legislative objective and of respect
for the fiduciary obligations it owes to the Aboriginal peoples.
Virtually all Supreme Court decisions on justification, including Sparrow,
have been in relation to Aboriginal or treaty rights to hunt or fish. 83 Valid legis-
lative objectives in those cases involved such things as conservation, safety, and
allocation of the resource among various users - matters that are obviously not
very relevant to justification of infringements of the inherent right of self-gov-
ernment. In the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court discussed the issue of
justification in relation to infringements of Aboriginal title to land and added
economic development by a variety of means to the list of potentially valid leg-
islative objectives. 84 Once again, this is not very relevant to justification of
infringements of the inherent right of self-government.
8 5
One can, nonetheless, extract some general principles from the case law on
justification. For a legislative objective to meet the first branch of the Sparrow
justification test, it must be compelling and substantial. In general terms, what
this seems to mean is that the objective is more important to Canadian society
as a whole - including the Aboriginal peoples who are part of that society -
than is protection of the Aboriginal or treaty right; thus, infringement of the
right can be justified. Another way the Supreme Court has expressed this is that,
given the underlying purpose of section 35(1) is the reconciliation of the
Aboriginal peoples' prior presence in Canada with Crown sovereignty,86 the
79 This follows from the decision in R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53, which held that the rights that
were constitutionally entrenched by s.35(1) are not to be defined by legislation that restricted
them before that section's enactment: see ibid. at 1091-93. Otherwise, the Court recognized,
the 'crazy patchwork of regulations" that was in place prior to April 17, 1982, would be incor-
porated into the constittional definition of Aboriginal rights: ibid. at 1091.
80 The Act in force at that time was the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.1-6, as amended.
81 I am assuming that assertion of Crown sovereignty, Confederation, and the enactment of the
Indian Act did not extinguish the inherent right of self-government. For support for this view,
see Campbell, supra note 12; Partners in Confederation, supra note 16 at 31-36.
82 Supra note 53.
83 E.g., see the cases cited in note 70, supra.
84 Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 165 (Lamer C.J.).
85 While economic development is obviously an important element of First Nation governance,
the economic development the Supreme Court had in mind in Delgamuukw was of the prov-
ince of British Columbia, not of First Nations. For critical commentary on the Court's view
that economic development can take precedence over the protection of Aboriginal title, see K.
McNeil, "Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right", in Emerging Justice?,
supra note 5 at 292.
86 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, especially at para. 31 (Lamer C.J.).
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constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples must give way in appropriate cir-
cumstances to substantial and compelling Parliamentary objectives.
8 7
It must be kept in mind that the onus of proving a valid legislative objective
is on the Crown.88 In the context of infringement of the inherent right of self-
government by the Indian Act, one therefore must ask what kind of objectives
the Crown could present that would justify replacing inherent-right forms of
government with band council governments. When the Indian Act was first
enacted in 1876, the main objective of Parliament appears to have been the
eventual assimilation of Indian people into Canadian society.8 9 Nonetheless, it
seems that in the case of an infringement that originated before the enactment
of section 35(1), the time for which justification must be proven is the post-sec-
tion 35(1) time of actual conflict between the right and the infringing legisla-
tion that caused the matter to come before the court. 90 If this is correct, then, in
the event a First Nation were to challenge the current application of the Indian
Act band governance provisions to it and prove that they infringe its inherent
right of self-government, the Crown would have to show a valid present-day
legislative objective for the infringement. This might be difficult, as the kinds of
valid legislative objectives the Supreme Court has accepted until now all relate
to the compelling and substantial interests of Canadian society as a whole.
What compelling and substantial interest of Canadian society would justify the
imposition of a form of government on a First Nation against its wishes? In that
situation, one would expect that the democratic values of Canada9' (not to
mention the international principle of self-determination 92) would generally
support the right of self-government against the infringing legislation.
87 See R. v. Gladstone, supra note 53, especially at paras. 72-75 (Lamer C.J.); Delgamuukw, supra
note 9 at paras. 161, 165 (Lamer C.J.). For critical commentary on the connection between jus-
tification and reconciliation, see K. McNeil, "Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: The
Opposing Views of Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin" (2003) 2 Indigenous L.J. 1.
88 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1110.
89 See Bartlett, supra note 21 at 16-19; J. L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An
Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy", in I. A. L. Getty and A. S. Lussier, eds., As Long as
the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1983) at 39; J. S. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strat-
egy and Constitutional Change", ibid. at 56.
90 This is at least implicit in the cases on justification cited supra in note 70. Those cases all
involved infringement of Aboriginal or treaty rights to hunt or fish, a valid legislative objective
for which is conservation. Obviously, the time for assessing whether an infringement is neces-
sary for conservation purposes is the time the infringement is challenged, not the time when it
was first imposed, as conservation needs may well have changed in the meantime. However, in
the case of a one-time infringement, such as clear-cutting Aboriginal title land, the time for jus-
tification would have to be the time when the infringement occurred.
91 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4.
92 This principle, as expressed, for example, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (in
force as of 3 January 1976), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16
December 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), art. 1(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (in force as of 23 March
1976), and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/2/Add. 1, art. 3, provides that all peoples have the right to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." For discus-
sion of this right in relation to Indigenous peoples, see E.-I. Daes, "The Right of Indigenous
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Let us assume, as one possibility, that the federal government alleged that the
current legislative objective for the Indian Act's band council provisions is the
democratic governance of Indian bands.. While a court might accept the valid-
ity of that objective in principle, it is doubtful whether that would be sufficient
for it to decide that the legislative objective is valid in the sense of providing jus-
tification for the continuing imposition of the Act's band council form of gov-
ernment on a particular First Nation. Instead, the court would likely have to go
further and find that the replacement of that First Nation's inherent-right form
of government with band council government actually furthered the objective
of democratic governance in the present day. This would involve very complex
cultural and political issues that might be difficult for the court to assess. For
example, the court would probably have to start by determining what is meant
by "democratic governance." This is not something that could be answered in
the abstract - it would have to take account of the culture, traditions, and con-
temporary circumstances of the First Nation in question. The representative
form of government familiar to most Canadians is certainly not the only form
of democratic government and may, in fact, be inconsistent with the democratic
traditions of at least some Aboriginal peoples.93 In this situation, I think it
would be incumbent on the Crown to prove not only that the Act's band coun-
cil regime is more democratic than the First Nation's inherent-right form of
government, but also that it is sufficiently so to justify favouring the former over
the latter despite the impact such an outcome might have on the culture of the
community. Keeping in mind that the constitutional rights of the First Nation
would be at stake in this context, the burden on the Crown to prove that the
legislative objective is indeed valid should be onerous in these circumstances.
Assuming, however, that the Crown was able to show a valid legislative
objective for infringing the inherent right of self-government today, it would
still have to meet the second branch of the Sparrow justification test by proving
respect for the fiduciary obligations it owes to First Nations. In Sparrow, the
Supreme Court indicated some of the questions that, depending on the circum-
stances, need to be addressed in this context:
... whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order
to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation,
fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in
question has been consulted with respect to the conservation mea-
sures being implemented.
9 4
Peoples to 'Self-Determination' in the Contemporary World Order", in D. Clark and R. G.
Williamson, eds., Self-Determination: International Perspectives (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1996) at 47; S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996) at 75-125; R. T Coulter, "Indigenous Peoples and the Law of Self-Determination:
A Possible Consensus", Indian Law Resource Center, Helena, Montana, 18 October 2002 (copy
on file with author).
93 See generally M. Boldt and J. A. Long, "Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideol-
ogies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indians" (1984) 17 Can. J. of Political Science 537; R.
L. Barsh, "The Nature and Spirit of North American Political Systems" (1986) 10 Am. Indian
Q. 181. More specifically, see Johnston, supra note 57; Porter, supra note 59.
94 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1119.
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The relevance of these questions - in particular those regarding compensation
and consultation - to infringements of Aboriginal title to land was accepted by
Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw.9 5 However, he pointed out that "the choice
between them will in large part be a function of the nature of the aboriginal
right at issue." 96 So while Aboriginal title, for example, has an economic aspect
that will make compensation relevant to justification of its infringement, 97 that
may not be the case where infringements of the inherent right of self-govern-
ment are concerned. Minimal impact and consultation, however, would both
seem to be relevant to justification of infringements of this right. Whether the
Crown could meet the burden of proving these in situations where the band
governance provisions of the Indian Act have been imposed on a particular First
Nation is a good question, the answer to which would depend on the factual
context.
It is nonetheless worth remarking in this context that infringements of
Aboriginal and treaty rights to fish appear to be more easily justified when the
rights in question have a commercial dimension. 98 The reason for this is that
the economic interests of other users of the resource are involved to a greater
extent where commercial rights are concerned. 99 Similarly, the economic aspect
of Aboriginal title seems to have caused the Supreme Court to regard infringe-
ments of that title as justifiable in appropriate circumstances in order to achieve
the objective of "reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by
aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the
recognition that 'distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a
broader social, political and economic community."'100 Where the inherent
right of self-government is concerned, the impact of the exercise of that right on
the economic interests of other Canadians would probably be relatively low -
indeed, to the extent that self-government facilitates the economic development
of First Nations, other Canadians might actually benefit! On the other hand,
the importance of that right to First Nations is very high, as their ability to
maintain their cultural, social, and political distinctiveness depends on the
extent to which they can govern their own communities in accordance with
their own traditions. For these reasons, it should be difficult for the Crown to
justify infringements of the right of self-government.
The Crown's duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples in relation to infringe-
ments of their rights presents difficulties in situations where the infringement
originated prior to the enactment of section 35(1) in 1982. While this duty
95 Supra note 9 at paras. 162-69.
96 Ibid. at para. 162.
97 Ibid. at para. 169.
98 Compare R v. Gladstone, supra note 53, and R. v. Marshall [No. 2], supra note 14, with R. v.
Sparrow, supra note 53. For critical commentary, see K. McNeil, "How Can Infringements of
the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?", in Emerging Justice?, supra note
5 at 281.
99 See fl v. Gladstone, supra note 53 at paras. 57-75.
100 Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 165 (Lamer C.J.) [emphasis in original], quoting from
Gladstone, supra note 53 at para. 73. For critical commentary on the connection between justi-
fication and reconciliation, see McNeil, supra note 87.
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existed as a fiduciary obligation in appropriate circumstances prior to 1982,101
it was not a constitutional duty and so was not binding on Parliament. As a
result, legislative infringements of Aboriginal rights that took place before 1982
did not have to be justified by showing adequate consultation with the Aborigi-
nal people concerned. 10 2 Given this lack of a constitutional duty to consult
prior to 1982, it may be difficult for the Crown to prove that it did in fact con-
sult with any particular First Nation before imposing the Indian Act's band gov-
ernance provisions upon it. Moreover, we have seen that, in the case of an
infringement of an Aboriginal right that originated pre-section 35(1) and con-
tinued thereafter, the time for meeting the justification test is probably when
the infringement is challenged, rather than when it began. 10 3 So when would
the duty to consult have arisen? The duty must have arisen as a matter of consti-
tutional law when section 35(1) came into force in 1982, as that is when
infringements of the inherent right of self-government by imposition of the
Indian Act's band governance provisions would have become unconstitutional
unless justified. As a practical matter, however, the federal government cannot
be expected to have immediately initiated consultations in 1982 with the more
than 600 Indian bands in Canada that are subject to the Indian Act. Instead, it
may be up to First Nations who object to the imposition of the Act's band gov-
ernance provisions on them to initiate these discussions. If the federal govern-
ment fails to participate in meaningful consultation after the matter has been
raised, it may have difficulty justifying any infringement of the right of self-gov-
ernment from then on.
104
Failure by the Crown to prove either a valid legislative objective or respect
for its fiduciary obligations in this context does not mean that the band gover-
nance provisions of the Indian Act would be held to be ultra vires and struck
down by a court. It would simply mean that those provisions would not apply
to the First Nation that proved they infringed its inherent right of self-govern-
ment. The band governance provisions would continue to be otherwise valid
101 See Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, where the Supreme Court held that the Crown
breached the fiduciary duty it owed to the Musqueam Nation because it did not consult them
regarding the terms of a lease for a portion of their reserve lands. In Delgamuukw, supra note 9
at para. 168, Lamer C.J. referred to this as a breach of the Crown's "fiduciary duty at common
law".
102 See the cases cited supra in note 52. The decision of the Supreme Court in Davey v. Isaac, supra
note 59, reveals the lack of a legally-enforceable duty to consult before imposition of the
Indian Act's band governance provisions on First Nations.
103 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
104 In relation to this, see the recent decisions of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2002] 2 C.N.L.R.
312, and Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [20021 2 C.N.L.R. 121, addi-
tional reasons [2002] 4 C.N.L.R. 117, leave to appeal granted by the S.C.C., 20 March 2003,
[2003] 2 C.N.L.R. iv. In those cases, it was held that an Aboriginal right does not actually have
to be proven in court for the duty to consult to arise. While those decisions related to Aborigi-
nal tide and resource use, the same principle would seem to apply to an Aboriginal right of
self-government. For further discussion of when the duty to consult arises, see S. Lawrence and
P. Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty
to Consult" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252.
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and still apply to other First Nations that did not prove such an infringement.
Some First Nations might be content to operate under those provisions for the
time being without alleging any infringement of their inherent right of self-gov-
ernment. They would be able to do so without forfeiting their right to challenge
the application of those provisions to them at some future time.
10 5
In 1985 and 1988, the Parliament of Canada enacted amendments to the
Indian Act10 6 that have had an impact on First Nation governance. As those
amendments came after the enactment of section 35(1), their application to any
particular First Nation could be challenged from the time they came into force
as a violation of its inherent right of self-government. These amendments are
therefore worth examining.
D. Post-Section 35(1) Amendments to the Indian Act
The most important amendments made to the Indian Act in 1985 involve
entitlement to be registered as an Indian under the Act, First Nation control
over band membership, and the legislative authority of band councils.
The amendments respecting entitlement to be registered as an Indian were pri-
marily designed to address gender discrimination in the Act. In particular, the pro-
vision that caused Indian women to lose their status if they married non-Indian
men was removed. Women who had lost their status as a result of this provision
once again became entitled to be registered, as did their children. 1°7 At the same
time, First Nations were given the option of taking control over their own mem-
bership by establishing membership rules by majority vote of their electors. 10 8
Membership rules cannot, however, deny membership to persons (including
women who had their status restored) who were entitled to be members of that
First Nation prior to the time the membership rules came into force.
10 9
The membership provisions in the 1985 amendments, in particular the pro-
vision limiting the authority of First Nations to exclude current members, were
challenged by three First Nations in Alberta in Sawridge Band v. Canada" 0 on
the ground that those provisions violated their Aboriginal and treaty rights to
determine their own membership. Muldoon J. decided that no Aboriginal or
treaty right to control membership had been established by the plaintiffs, but
even if the alleged Aboriginal right had existed it would have been extinguished
by the 1876 Indian Act before the relevant treaties were negotiated. This deci-
sion was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal on the ground that the
105 However, acceptance of the application of the band governance provisions by a particular First
Nation might make it more difficult to establish an infringement later on, or might make it
easier for the Crown to meet the justification test if an infringement could be shown.
106 R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st Supp.), c.17 (4th Supp.), c.4 3 (4th Supp.).
107 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, s.6, as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st Supp.), s.4, c.43
(4th Supp.), s.1. See Bartlett, supra note 21 at 13-14; A. Skarsgard, Indian Status and Band
Membership: Update 1986, Legal Information Service Report No. 23 (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1986); D. Opekokew, "Self-Identification and Cultural
Preservation: A Comment on Recent Indian Act Amendments" [1986] 2 C.N.L.R. 1.
108 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5, s.10, as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st Supp.), s.4 .
109 Ibid., s.10 (4) and (5). See Bartlett, supra note 21 at 15.
110 [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 121 (F.C.T.D.), rev'd [1997] 3 F.C. 580 (F.C.A.).
Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
record disclosed a sufficient basis for finding a reasonable apprehension of bias
on the part of the trial judge."' The case was therefore sent back to trial with-
out any decision on the merits.
A First Nation's authority to determine its own membership is usually con-
sidered an important aspect of the inherent right of self-government." 2 Despite
its inconclusive outcome, the Sawridge case nonetheless raised the question of
whether this aspect of self-government had already been extinguished by the
Indian Act prior to the enactment of section 35(1) in 1982. This question
relates to the broader issue of whether specific aspects of the inherent right of
self-government could have been extinguished piecemeal, without extinguish-
ing other aspects of the right, an issue that will not be resolved here. However, it
is worth pointing out that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Pamajewon1 13
treated the inherent right of self-government (assuming it exists) as a bundle of
rights over specific areas of jurisdiction, each of which has to be established sep-
arately. It might follow from this that a specific self-government right, such as
the right to determine membership, could have been extinguished without
other self-government rights being affected. On the other hand, one could
regard the taking away of a First Nation's right to determine its own member-
ship (if that in fact happened' 14) as an infringement of its broader right of self-
government rather than an extinguishment of the narrower right to determine
membership." 5 This issue, while currently unresolved in Canadian law, is obvi-
ously very important because any self-government rights that were extinguished
prior to the enactment of section 35(1) would not have been recognized and
affirmed by that subsection, whereas rights that were merely infringed would
have been recognized and affirmed and so the infringement would have to be
justified in order to be effective post-section 35(1). 1 16
The 1985 and 1988 amendments to the Indian Act also extended the legisla-
tive authority of band councils to include, among other things, the power to
make by-laws respecting "the residence of band members and other persons on
the reserve" and providing "for the rights of spouses and children who reside
with members of the band on the reserve with respect to any matter in relation
to which the council may make by-laws in respect of members of the band. "117
111 [1997) 3 EC. 580, leave to appeal refused without reasons, [1997) S.C.C.A. No. 430.
112 E.g., see Bartlett, supra note 21 at 16; RCAP Report, supra note 16, Vol. 2, Restructuring the
Relationship, Pt. 1, 237-39. See also McArthur v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development), [1992] 4 C.N.L.R. 33 (Sask. Q.B.), especially at 40.
113 Supra note 7.
114 The burden of proving extinguishment is on the Crown, and requires "clear and plain" legisla-
tive intent: R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1099; R. v. Gladstone, supra note 53 at paras. 31-38;
Delgamuukuv supra note 9 at para. 180. See generally K. McNeil, "Extinguishment ofAborigi-
nal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion" (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L.
Rev. 301.
115 This seems to be the position of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: see RCAP
Report, supra note 16, Vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship, Pt. 1, 202-12 (apparently written,
however, before the S.C.C. decision in R. v. Pamajewon, supra note 7).
116 See R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53.
117 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5, s.81(l) (p. 1) and (p.2), added by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st
Supp.), s. 15.
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Band councils were also given the authority to restrain contraventions of band
by-laws by court action. 118 The patronizing requirement in section 83 for a dec-
laration by the Governor in Council that a band had "reached an advanced
stage of development" before the band council could make money by-laws" 9
was removed so that all band councils were accorded this authority, though still
subject to the approval of the Minister.120 Finally, band councils were given the
authority, with the assent of a majority of the electors who attended a special
meeting called for that purpose, to make by-laws prohibiting the sale, manufac-
ture, and possession of intoxicants, and prohibiting persons from being intoxi-
cated, on the reserve.
12 1
As these amendments generally expanded the powers of band councils, from
one perspective it might be argued that they could not have infringed the inher-
ent right of self-government. However, as band council government is statutory
and was imposed on at least some First Nations without their consent, from
another perspective it seems that any changes to the authority of band councils
would amount to further infringements of that right. For the Six Nations, for
example, expansion of the powers of the band council might infringe further on
the exercise of authority by their traditional government. One cannot, however,
answer the question of whether the amendments infringed the inherent right of
self-government of First Nations generally, as the answer depends on the specific
circumstances of each First Nation. If an infringement were found, the issue of
whether it could be justified would also depend on the circumstances of the
First Nation in question. However, because the infringement would have
occurred after section 35(1) came into force, the federal government would
have been under an obligation to consult with affected First Nations before
imposing the changes to band governance upon them. Failure to consult should
make it- difficult for the Crown to justify any infringements caused by the
amendments.
122
E. The Indian Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
The impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms123 on the Indian
Act is not directly relevant to the issue of whether that Act has infringed the
inherent right of self-government. However, the decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Corhiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)124
might provide some insight into how the Court would deal with an allegation
that the Indian Act infringes that right.
In Corbiere, the plaintiffs, members of the Batchewana First Nation in
Ontario, challenged the constitutional validity of the part of section 77(1) of
118 Ibid., s.81(3), added by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st Supp.), s.15.
119 S.82 of the 1951 Act: see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
120 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, s.83, as amended by R.S.C 1985, c.17 (4th Supp.), s.1O.
121 Ibid, s.85.1, added by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (1st Supp.), s.16.
122 In Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 168, Lamer C.J. said, albeit in relation to infringement of
Aboriginal title, that (t] here is always a duty of consultation."
123 Supra note 43.
124 Supra note 43.
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the Indian Act that limited the right to vote in band council elections to band
members who were "ordinarily resident on the reserve." 125 They contended that
excluding non-resident band members from elections violated their section
15(1) equality rights under the Charter. The Supreme Court agreed and unani-
mously held that the words "and is ordinarily resident on the reserve" be struck
from section 77(1), after an 18-month period to give Parliament an opportu-
nity to deal with the consequences of the decision.
126
The first thing to notice is that the Supreme Court rejected the option of
simply declaring the offending words in section 77(1) to be inapplicable to the
Batchewana First Nation. Instead, the Court held that the voting restriction
affected most, if not all, First Nations and was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the equality rights of off-reserve members generally. As discussed above,
the Court would be unlikely to adopt this approach where an allegation was
made that the band governance provisions of the Indian Act offended the inher-
ent right of self-government of a particular First Nation, as Aboriginal rights
(unlike the Charter right to equality) are specific and can vary from one First
Nation to another. 127 So establishing that those provisions violate the inherent
right of self-government of one First Nation would not necessarily mean that
they violate that of other First Nations.1
28
Similarly, the Court's reasons for concluding that the voting restriction in
section 77(1) violated section 15(1) of the Charter are not very relevant to the
question of whether the band governance provisions of the Indian Act violate
the inherent right of self-government of particular First Nations. Equality rights
pertain to everyone in Canada, whereas the Aboriginal right of self-government
is held only by the Aboriginal peoples and its expression can vary in form and
content from one First Nation to another. 129 However, after finding a violation
of section 15(1), the Court considered whether the violation could be justified
under section 1 of the Charter. The Court's section 1 analysis does bear some
125 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, s.77(1).
126 There were two judgments, one authored by McLachlin and Bastarache JJ. (Lamer C.J., Cory
and Major JJ. concurring), the other by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (Gonthier, lacobucci and Binnie
JJ. concurring). As they came to the same conclusions for very similar reasons with respect to
the issues discussed in this article, I will refer simply to the decision of the Court, rather than
to the separate judgments, except when quoting.
127 See text accompanying notes 76-77, 105, supra. Compare Slattery (2000), supra note 17 at
213-15, where it is argued that the right of self-government is a generic rather than a specific
right.
128 Also, as L'Heureux-Dub6 J. pointed out in Corbiere, supra note 43 at para. 112, it would be
the s.74(1) order in council bringing a First Nation within the electoral provisions of the
Indian Act that would be challengeable, rather than the provisions themselves: see text accom-
panying note 140, infia.
129 In R v. Van der Peet, supra note 86 at paras. 18-19, Lamer C.J. distinguished Charter rights,
which are "general and universal," from Aboriginal rights, which are "held only by aboriginal
members of Canadian society". At para. 69, he said that Aboriginal rights also vary from one
Aboriginal group to another because they "depend entirely on the traditions, customs and
practices of the particular aboriginal community claiming the right" [emphasis in original]. See
also R. v. Pamajewon, supra note 7. Compare Slattery (2000), supra note 17.
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resemblance to its approach to justification for violation of section 35(1)
Aboriginal rights and is worth examining in this context.
130
The Court in Corbiere followed the approach to section 1 that had been laid
down by Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes13 1 and refined in Egan v. Canada.132 In the
latter case, lacobucci J. summarized the Court's section I approach in this way:
A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once
two conditions are met. First, the objective of the legislation must
be pressing and substantial. Second, the means chosen to attain this
legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a
free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second require-
ment, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must
be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2) the
impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guarantee;
and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the
measure and its objective so that the attainment of the legislative
goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the right.1
33
The requirement of a pressing and substantial legislative objective is obviously
very similar, if not identical, to the requirement of a compelling and substantial
legislative objective to justify infringements of Aboriginal rights. However, as
the second branch of the OakeslEgan test is based on what can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society, it differs from the second branch of
the Sparrow test, which is based on respect for the Crown's fiduciary obligations
to the Aboriginal peoples. 134 The requirement of minimal impairment is none-
theless equivalent to the Sparrow requirement that there be "as little infringe-
ment as possible in order to effect the desired result."
135
In Corbiere, the Court found that the objective in restricting voting to
reserve residents was to ensure that band members who had the closest connec-
tion with the reserve elected the council that would make decisions affecting life
on the reserve. This objective was held to be sufficiently pressing and substantial
to meet the first branch of the section 1 test. 136 However, the Court decided
that the second branch of the test had not been met because the Crown had
failed to demonstrate that complete exclusion of non-resident members from
band council elections was necessary to meet the legislative objective. Specifi-
130 For general discussion, see D. Newman, "The Limitation of Rights: A Comparative Evolution
and Ideology of the Oakesand Sparrow Tests" (1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 543. Note, however, that
in P, v. Adams, [19961 3 S.C.R. 101, at paras. 53-54, Lamer C.J. took a stricter approach to
statutes that confer administrative discretion that might be exercised so as to infringe Aborigi-
nal rights than to statutes that confer equivalent discretion that might be used to infringe
Charter rights.
131 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
132 [1995) 2 S.C.R. 513.
133 Ibid. at para. 182.
134 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
135 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1119.
136 Corbiere, supra note 43 at para. 21 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.), paras. 99-100 (L'Heureux-
Dub6 J.).
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cally, the Court held that the Crown had not met the requirement of showing
minimal impairment of the section 15(1) rights of off-reserve members. 137
As suggested above, the Crown would probably have a difficult time today
establishing a compelling and substantial legislative objective for infringement
of the inherent right of self-government by the band governance provisions in
the Indian Act. 138 But even if the Crown could surmount this hurdle, the Cor-
biere decision suggests that the Crown might also have difficulty proving that
the objective (whatever it might be) has been met with as little infringement of
the inherent right as possible.
Even more to the point, however, the Court in Corbiere suggested that
Aboriginal governance rights might take precedence over the band governance
provisions in the Indian Act. McLachlin and Bastarache JJ. observed that, if a
"band could establish an Aboriginal right to restrict voting, as suggested by the
Court of Appeal, that right would simply have precedence over the terms of the
Indian Act."' 39 L'Heureux-Dub J. commented as follows:
If certain bands can demonstrate an Aboriginal or treaty right to
restrict non-residents from voting, this in no way affects the consti-
tutionality of the impugned section of the Indian Act. It is the order
in council made pursuant to s.74(1), bringing the band within the
application of the Indian Act's electoral rules, which would have to
be challenged under such a claim. In analysing such a case, it would
have to be determined whether an Aboriginal right had been
proven, whether the legislation as it then stands infringes that right,
and whether that infringement is justified.... 140
These comments confirm that proof of an Aboriginal right relating to gover-
nance (such as the right to participate in choice of political leaders) could result
in a declaration that some or all of the band governance provisions in the Indian
Act are constitutionally inapplicable to First Nations that are able to establish
such a right. The Corbiere decision therefore reveals that the Supreme Court
would'be open to the arguments presented in this article for challenging the
application of specific provisions of that Act to particular First Nations.
III. CHALLENGING THE APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION LIKE
THE FIRSTNATIONS GOVERNANCEACT
From the foregoing, it appears that the application of the Indian Act's band
governance provisions has probably infringed the inherent right of self-govern-
137 Ibid. at para. 21 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.), paras. 103-5 (L'Heureux-Dubd J.).
138 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
139 Corbiere, supra note 43 at para. 22. See also the Federal Court of Appeal decision, Batchewana
Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), J1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 21, espe-
cially at 26-31, 58-59, varied Corbiere, supra note 43.
140 Corbiere, supra note 42 at para. 112, relying upon R. v. Sparrow, supra note 52, and R. v. Van
der Peet, supra note 85.
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ment of at least some First Nations. 14 1 Furthermore, amendments to those pro-
visions since the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 might
also violate the inherent right of self-government of particular First Nations. 1
42
The same can be said as well of the alterations to band governance that were
contained in the First Nations Governance Act (FNGA). These included signifi-
cant changes in relation to the selection and authority of band councils, as well
as to band administration, financial management, accountability, and the appli-
cation of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 143 As the proposed legislation was
complex and has now been withdrawn, an analysis of specific provisions will
not be undertaken. It may, nonetheless, be useful to offer some general com-
ments on how the application of the Act might have been challenged by First
Nations, as this will shed light on the way the constitutional recognition of the
inherent right of self-government in 1982 has limited the legislative authority of
Parliament.
It needs to be acknowledged at the outset that the FNGA did not purport to
infringe the inherent right of self-government. On the contrary, the following
section, which was added to Bill C-7 on May 28, 2003, was evidently included
to make clear that Parliament did not intent to infringe any Aboriginal or treaty
rights:
3.1 For greater certainty, nothing in this Act shall be construed so
as to abrogate or derogate from any existing aboriginal or treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada under section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.144
The effect of this non-derogation clause would, however, have been uncertain.
While there can be no doubt that it would have provided direction to judges to
construe the Act ifpossible so as not to abrogate or derogate from any existing
(i.e., unextinguished 145) Aboriginal or treaty rights, they should be interpreting
legislation in this way in any case. 146 But what if that were not possible because
there was an irreconcilable conflict between the legislation and the inherent
141 See text accompanying notes 57-77, supra.
142 See text accompanying notes 107-22, supra.
143 R.S.C. 198 5 , c. H-6.
144 Bill C-7, First Nations Governance Act, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl., on-line: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
PDF/37/2/parbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-7 2.pdf>, (accessed 7 August 2003).
Section 3.1 was part of a package of amendments presented to the House of Commons by the
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Northern Development and Natural Resources,
27 May 2003, on-line: <htp:/lwww.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/AANR/Studies/Reports/
AANRRPO4-e.htm> (accessed 7 August 2003).
145 See R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1091.
146 General rules of statutory interpretation include a presumption that legislatures do not intend
to abrogate or derogate from vested rights: see Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conserva-
tion Board, 11933] S.C.R. 629 at 638; A.G. Canada v. Hallet and Carey Ld, [1952 A.C. 427
at 450 (PC.). Moreover, ambiguities in statutes are to be interpreted in favour of the Aborigi-
nal peoples: Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 387 at 402; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 98-100 (Dickson
C.J.) at 142-43 (La Forest J.).
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right of self-government of a particular First Nation? Should the Act be declared
inoperative to the extent of the conflict, thereby avoiding any infringement of
the inherent right? Alternatively, should the Act be taken to apply to that First
Nation because it could not be construed otherwise, thereby raising the issue of
justifiable infringement? While the former approach would eliminate the possi-
bility of justifiable infringement of the inherent right by the Act, one might
expect clearer words to have been used to communicate that intent. For exam-
ple, instead of the words "nothing in this Act shall be construed," the drafters
could have employed language like "this Act is not intended and shall not be
applied so as to abrogate or derogate from any existing aboriginal or treaty
rights."
147
In any case, to avoid the application of the FNGA a First Nation would still
have had to prove that it has an inherent right of self-government in relation to
matters dealt with by the Act. 14 8 If it could show that the Act would have dero-
gated from that right and the non-derogation clause was held to be effective to
protect the right, the Act would simply not have applied to the First Nation to
that extent. If, however, the Act were held to apply despite the non-derogation
clause so as to cause a primafacie infringement of the inherent right, the federal
government would then have had the opportunity to try to prove the infringe-
147 While space does not permit this matter to be pursued further here, some indication of the
possible effect of s.3.1 might be found in judicial decisions dealing with other non-derogation
and construction clauses. For example, s. 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
supra note 43, contains language similar to that of s.3.1: "The guarantee in this Charter of cer-
tain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aborigi-
nal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada...".
Commentators on this section have generally concluded that it provides substantive protection
against the Charter to Aboriginal and treaty rights, including rights of self-government: for an
insightful discussion of the literature and case law, see K. Wilkins, "... But We Need the Eggs:
The Royal Commission, the Charter of Rights and the Inherent Right of Aboriginal Self-Gov-
ernment" (1999) 49 U. T LJ 53 at 108-18. Other Canadian statutes contain a provision
similar or identical to s.3.1: e.g., see the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, R.S.C. 1985, 2nd
Supp., c.36, s.3; Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.W-9, s.2(3), added by S.C. 1994, c.23,
s.4; Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 2 2, s.2(3); Firearms Act, S.C. 1995,
c.39, s. 2(3); Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c.31, s.2.1; Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998, c.10, s.3.
Regarding the non-derogation clause in the Firearms Act, see Bellegardv. Canada (A,G.), 2002
F.C.T. 1131. Also, the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44, s.2 provides that
[e]very law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian
Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or
infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any
of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared...
In R. v. Drybones, [19701 S.C.R. 282, the dissenting judges were of the view that this provision
merely expresses a rule of statutory interpretation, but the majority held that it provides sub-
stantive protection so that the Bill of Rights prevails over other statutory provisions in the event
of irreconcilable conflict. In Authorson v. Canada (A. G.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 40, Major J., for
the Court, affirmed the ruling in Drybones that, "[wihere federal legislation conflicts with the
protections of the Bill of Rights, unless the conflicting legislation expressly declares that it
operates notwithstanding the Bill of Rights as required by s.2, the Bill of Rights applies and the
legislation is inoperative". See also Curry. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889.
148 See R. v. Pamajewon, supra note 7.
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ment was justified by showing a valid legislative objective and respect for the
Crown's fiduciary obligations. 1
49
If we assume that, despite the non-derogation clause, justifiable infringe-
ment of the inherent right of self-government by the FNGA would have been
possible, would the federal government have been able to meet the require-
ments for justification? Given that the issue of whether an infringement had
occurred would generally have depended on proof by a particular First Nation
of its right of self-government and of interference with that right by specific
provisions of the FNGA, 150 it is difficult to speculate on whether these require-
ments could have been met in specific cases. Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile
to offer some general comments on the Crown's obligation to justify infringe-
ments.
Regarding the obligation to prove a valid legislative objective, the FNGA
(unlike the Indian Act) explicitly stated the legislative objectives of Parliament in
section 3:
3. The purposes of this Act are
(a) to provide bands with more effective tools of governance on
an interim basis pending the negotiation and implementa-
tion of the inherent right of self-government;
(a. 1) to enable bands to achieve independence in the man-
agement of their affairs;
(a.2) to reduce the degree of involvement by the Minister in
band affairs;
(b) to enable bands to respond more effectively to their particu-
lar needs and aspirations, including the ability to collaborate
for certain purposes; and
149 This is the approach L'Heureux-Dub J. outlined in Corbiere in relation to justifiable infringe-
ment by the Indian Act of an Aboriginal or treaty right to restrict voting rights: see quotation
in text accompanying note 140, supra.
150 Note, however, that in cases involving selection of leaders by custom, the Federal Court has
held that Indian bands have an inherent right to do so without requiring proof of this right:
see the cases cited in note 75, supra. The reason for not requiring proof of this right appears to
be that it is acknowledged by necessary implication by the Indian Act's definition of "council
of the band": see text following note 43, supra. Apparently, it is a right that all bands have. Nor
would it have been extinguished by a ministerial order bringing a band under the Act's elec-
toral system, as revocation of such an order automatically revives the right to choose leaders by
custom: see Jock v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [19921 1 C.N.L.R. 103
(F.C.T.D.), at 110-11; Sparvier, supra note 75 at 185. See also Badger v. Canada, [1991] 2
C.N.L.R. 17 (F.C.T.D.), affirmed (1992), 146 N.R. 79 (F.C.A.); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister
of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1994] 1 E.C. 394 (F.C.T.D.), at 405; Jenniss c. Jenniss, supra
note 56; Mohawk of Kanesatake v. Mohawk ofKanesatake (Council), [20031 F.C.J. No. 156. As
a result, First Nations should have been able to mount a general challenge to the constitution-
ality of the leadership selection provisions of the FNGA by relying on the right that all Indian
bands have to choose their leaders by custom and showing how the FNGA would have
infringed that right (which the Act would have done by placing restrictions on the right that
are not in the current Indian Act). For more detailed discussion, see McNeil, supra note 77 at
15-21, 25-26.
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(c) to enable bands to design and implement their own regimes
in respect of leadership selection, administration of govern-
ment and financial management and accountability, while
providing rules for those bands that do not choose to do so.
While this would have made it easy to identify Parliament's objectives, a court
would still have had to determine whether these objectives were valid in the
sense of being so compelling and substantial that they justified infringement of
the constitutional right of self-government of the First Nation in question. As
discussed above in the context of the Indian Act, 151 this would probably involve
comparing the system of government provided by the FNGA (or specific aspects
of it) with the inherent-right government of the First Nation.
Assuming, however, that the Crown could have established that the legislative
objectives for the FNGA's band governance provisions were valid in the sense
required for an infringement of section 35(1) rights to be justified, it would still
have had to prove that the legislation respected the fiduciary obligations the fed-
eral government owes to particular First Nations. As we have seen, two aspects of
this branch of the justificatory test are minimal impairment of the infringed right
and consultation with the Aboriginal peoples concerned. 152 Regarding minimal
impairment, the Crown would have had to show that the Act's provisions met the
purposes stated in section 3 in a manner that did not impair the right of self-gov-
ernment any more than necessary.153 This burden could not have been dis-
charged by evidence of a general nature. As justification of infringement must
relate to the specific rights of the Aboriginal peoples who hold those rights,154 the
Crown would have had to present factual evidence on a case-by-case basis justi-
fying the application of the Act's provisions to each First Nation that was able to
establish a primafacie infringement of its right of self-government.
Assuming the Crown could have surmounted this hurdle of proving mini-
mal impairment, it would still have had to show that Canada's fiduciary obliga-
tions had been met by consultation. Chief Justice Lamer commented on the
duty to consult in relation to infringement of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw:
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important
decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to
151 See text accompanying note 93, supra.
152 See text accompanying notes 94-104, supra. It would probably have been necessary to deter-
mine as well whether the FNGA could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purposes that
are set out in s.3, just as the criteria for the application of s.1 of the Charter require that "the
rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation": Egan v. Canada,
supra note 132 at para. 182 (see text accompanying note 133, supra). For example, to the
extent that the FNGA would have restricted the right of Indian bands to choose their own
leaders by custom, one might ask how it would have met one of the purposes stated in s.3(c),
namely "to enable bands to design and implement their own regimes in respect of leadership
selection": see McNeil, supra note 77 at 21-22.
153 See the passage from R. v. Sparrow, supra note 53 at 1119, quoted in the text accompanying
note 94, supra.
154 See supra note 76.
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aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the mini-
mum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be
in good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the
concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most
cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some
cases may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, par-
ticularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in
relation to aboriginal lands.
155
The burden is therefore on the Crown to show that it has fulfilled its duty to
consult in a way that is appropriate in the circumstances.
The inherent right of self-government is fundamental to every First Nation.
It relates to and affects all their Aboriginal and treaty rights because, given the
communal nature of those rights, decisions respecting them are made through
the political structures of each community.1 56 So if any Aboriginal practice, cus-
tom or tradition "truly made the society what it was", 157 it would be that of self-
government. The vital importance of governance to Aboriginal societies was
clearly recognized by the Supreme Court in the Corbiere case. 158 Canada's con-
stitutional values of democracy and respect for minorities 159 also provide gen-
eral support for the fundamental importance of Aboriginal self-government. So
the nature and scope of the consultation necessary to justify infringements of
the right of self-government should be stringent and might even require the
actual consent of individual First Nations.
The communal nature of Aboriginal rights generally, and of the right of self-
government in particular, means that consultation has to be with the rights-
holding people as a community, not as individuals. 160 The Canadian govern-
ment claimed that it had consulted extensively with First Nations people before
drafting the FNGA. The "Backgrounder" that accompanied the Act on the gov-
ernment's website contained the following statement:
The proposed First Nations Governance Act is the result of one of
the most extensive consultations with First Nations people ever
undertaken in Canada. Throughout the spring, summer and fall of
2001, First Nations people across Canada participated in commu-
nity meetings, information sessions and discussion groups, and pro-
155 Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 168.
156 See the passage from Campbell, supra note 12 at para. 137, quoted in the text accompanying
note 13, supra.
157 These are the words Lamer C.J. used in R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 86 at para. 55 [emphasis
in original], to describe the practices, customs and traditions that give rise to Aboriginal rights.
158 Supra note 43.
159 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4. This is not to suggest that Aboriginal peoples
are simply minorities, but acknowledges that they are a minority of the Canadian population
demographicallj and so are vulnerable to the will of the majority expressed through Parliament.
In fact, their Aboriginal and treaty rights were accorded constitutional recognition and affir-
mation in 1982 to provide them with some protection against majority rule: see R. v. Sparrow,
supra note 53 at 1103-10.
160 On identification of the Aboriginal group in which the right of self-government is vested, see
supra note 77.
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vided their opinions and ideas through correspondence, the First
Nations Governance Web site and a toll-free call centre. More than
10,000 individuals and leaders expressed their views.
161
While the government obviously attempted to meet its obligation to consult
with First Nations before enacting legislation that could have a significant
impact on their Aboriginal and treaty rights, apparently it did not approach this
matter of consultation in an appropriate manner if it expected to justify
infringements of the inherent right of self-government. For an infringement to
be justified, consultation must take place with the actual holders of the right as
a community. Consultation with First Nations people generally, or with indi-
viduals who are members of a First Nation, will not serve to justify the infringe-
ment of a communal Aboriginal right held by that First Nation.
It can therefore be concluded that the changes to band governance in the
FNGA probably would not have applied to First Nations that could establish an
inherent right of self-government. If the non-derogation clause in section 3.1
was more than a rule of construction, justifiable infringement of that right by
the Act should have been excluded by the terms of the Act itself. In other words,
if section 3.1 would have had the substantive effect of making rights of self-gov-
ernment prevail over the Act in the event of irreconcilable conflict, justifiable
infringement would not have been able to occur. If, however, justifiable
infringement would have been possible despite section 3.1, and a First Nation
proved that the Act did infringe its inherent right to govern itself, the Crown
would then have had the opportunity to prove justification. To do so, it would
have had to show that the Act's legislative objectives were compelling and sub-
stantial and the Crown's fiduciary obligations had been respected, in particular
by proving minimal impairment of the right and adequate consultation with
the First Nation. As we have seen, it is very unlikely that the Crown would have
been able to surmount these hurdles.
IV. CONCLUSION
The band governance system in the Indian Act was generally imposed on
First Nations without their consent, in many, if not all, instances in violation of
their inherent right of self-government. While they probably had no legal
recourse against this prior to 1982, recognition of their Aboriginal and treaty
rights by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 changed this situation. As
the inherent right of self-government is no doubt an Aboriginal right, it has
enjoyed constitutional protection since 1982. This means that any infringe-
ments of it, including infringements that occurred prior to the enactment of
section 35(1), are challengeable. If an infringement is shown, the burden is then
on the Crown to prove it can be justified by showing a valid legislative objective
and respect for the Crown's fiduciary obligations.
161 "Backgrounder: First Nations Governance Act", on-line: <http://www.fng-gpn.gc.ca/FNGA
bkgrd e.asp> (accessed 17 June 2002). For more detailed information on the consultation pro-
cess and results, see "Communities First: First Nations Governance Consultation Report - Phase
1, January 2002", on-line: <hrtp://www.fng-gpn.gc.ca/CRPI 102 e.html> (accessed 1 July
2003).
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This article has attempted to demonstrate ways in which application of the
Indian Act, through successive amendments up to the present, has probably
infringed the inherent right of self-government of at least some, and possibly all,
First Nations in Canada. This is not to suggest that a legal action against the
constitutional validity of the Act's band governance provisions would succeed.
It is not so much the Act itself as its imposition on individual First Nations that
has infringed their inherent governance rights. Moreover, as infringement is in
part a factual matter that depends on proof of an Aboriginal right, individual
First Nations would bear the burden of proving how the Act has infringed their
inherent rights. Any challenges to the Act's band governance provisions there-
fore should be framed as challenges to their application to individual First
Nations, rather than as challenges to the constitutional validity of the provisions
themselves.
Consequently, the initiative is in the hands of individual First Nations. They
can choose to continue to live with the Indian Act's band governance provisions,
until such time as new governance arrangements are negotiated with them,
either individually or as part of broader changes to the relationship between the
Canadian government and First Nations generally. Or they can challenge the
application of those provisions, in whole or in part, 162 in Canadian courts by
showing how they infringe their inherent governance rights. Because such a
challenge would not question the constitutional validity of the provisions, it
would not affect their application to other First Nations who choose to con-
tinue to be governed by them for the time being. The political stability of First
Nation communities generally would therefore not be threatened by legal chal-
lenges brought by individual First Nations.
The analysis in this article also reveals the extent to which the Canadian gov-
ernment is probably stuck with the Indian Act's band governance provisions until
such time as different arrangements can be negotiated with First Nations.
Changes such as those proposed in the First Nations Governance Act, while they
may or may not be constitutional, would certainly be challengeable in their appli-
cation to individual First Nations. Our discussion has shown that, were a First
Nation to prove that the proposed legislation infringed its inherent governance
rights, the Crown would be hard pressed to convince a court that the infringe-
ment was justified. Quite apart from the persuasive political arguments against
this legislation, it is therefore just as well the federal government has chosen to
withdraw it. No one needs the protracted litigation, with its inevitable aggrava-
tion and cost, that unilateral federal action like this would have provoked. It is
better for everyone concerned to devote available energy and resources to nego-
tiating the way out of the Indian Act and into new relationships where the inher-
ent right of self-government will be respected and can be fulfilled.
162 It would be possible to challenge some, but not all, of the Act's band governance provisions
because in constitutional cases courts generally consider only the specific provisions being
challenged. For example, in Corbiere, supra note 43, the Supreme Court only ruled on the con-
stitutionality of s.77(l) of the Indian Act, even though other provisions in the Act (e.g.,
s.77(2)) probably suffer from the same defect.

